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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: A U.K. VIEW
Paul L. Davies*
INTRODUCTION
In his Pomerantz lecture Professor Richard Buxbaum has
provided an elegant and insightful analysis both of the issues
raised in the United States by the growth of institutional share-
holdings and of the international and comparative dimensions of
this topic.' This note seeks to add only some gloss from a U.K.
perspective to the picture presented by Professor Buxbaum. In
summary, it may be said that the picture in the United King-
dom is similar in many respects to that in the United States,
both in terms of the growth of institutional shareholding in gen-
eral and in terms of the particular pension-driven causes of that
growth. As in the United States, the late, and generally not
much lamented,2 takeover boom of the late 1980s led in the
United Kingdom to a revival of the corporate governance de-
bate. Industry accused the institutional shareholding community
of short-termism, a charge roundly rejected by the latter. At the
same time some influential voices sought to persuade institu-
tional shareholders of the virtues of closer monitoring of man-
agement, rather than reliance on market forces, as the main
method of disciplining inefficient management.3
On the other hand, there have been some interesting differ-
ences of emphasis. In particular, in spite of the public nature of
the row about short-termism, institutional shareholders in the
United Kingdom have been able to continue, by and large, to
exercise influence over their portfolio companies in the tradi-
tional, private way of bringing influence to bear upon manage-
* Fellow of Balliol College and Reader in the Law of the Enterprise in the Univer-
sity of Oxford.
1 Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Per-
spective, 57 BRooKLYN L REV. 1 (1991).
2 Except, of course, among the professional advisers to bidder and target companies.
For representative contributions, see CREATIVE TENSION? (National Aczociation of
Pension Funds, Ltd. 1990); P.R. hASH, SHonR-Tmusm ON TRiu (1990) (Report com-
missioned by the Institutional Fund Managers' Ass'n).
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ment behind closed doors.4 Specifically in terms of the legal
framework, it is worth noting that institutional shareholders in
the United Kingdom have not come under ERISA-type duties to
exercise the voting rights attached to their shareholdings, which
duty might have operated so as to make somewhat clearer the
policies the institutions were adopting towards their portfolio
companies. It is in fact unusual for the English institutions actu-
ally to exercise their voting rights.5 On the other hand, the insti-
tutions have not faced the threat to their rights as sharehold-
ers-upon which their behind-the-scenes influence depends in
some large degree-that U.S. institutions have faced, especially
in the takeover area. The theory of shareholder sovereignty and
management neutrality has remained the dominant one in the
regulatory structure for takeovers in the United Kingdom, and
so the institutions have had to bestir themselves neither to head
off unwelcome legislative initiatives nor to oppose charter
amendments put by potential target companies to their share-
holders in an attempt to render the company bid-proof. In other
words, although the short-termism debate has raised important
issues of public policy, the projected solutions to the prob-
lem-assuming that a problem exists-have not involved a sig-
nificant legal dimension nor have the main proponents of change
sought either to curtail or make more public the rights of the
institutional shareholders. This is well reflected in what seems to
be the consensus proposal for change, for those who think
change is necessary, namely that the institutions .should exercise
their present levers of power rather more actively and be aided
in this undertaking by the voluntary adoption by companies of a
policy of appointing more independent, nonexecutive directors.
This commentary will explore these themes in a little more
detail and then turn to an issue of principle that will arise in
the, perhaps unlikely, event of the institutional shareholders be-
coming close monitors of managerial performance in the United
Kingdom.
" See Mundheim, Institutions as Shareholders: The British Experience, 2 INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR 36 (1968).
Jackson, Management of UK Equity Portfolios, 27 BANK OF ENGLAND Q, BULL.
253, 257 (1987). In the United Kingdom, the institutional equivalent to the Department
of Labor under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1976 is the Occupa-
tional Pensions Board (OPB), constituted under the Social Security Act of 1973, but the
OPB has much less power than the Department of Labor.
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IL THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDING
The growth of institutional shareholding in the United
Kingdom in general-and of pension funds in particular-has
now reached heights even greater than those in the United
States. In 1969, 34.2 percent of listed U.K. equities were held by
institutions; by 1985 that figure had risen to 58.9 percent.' More
recent estimates put the figure at "over two-thirds."7 Within
those global figures the percentage held by pension funds in-
creased from 9 percent to 31.9 percent, a more than threefold
increase, whilst the next largest increase was that for insurance
companies, a mere fifty percent increase from 12.2 percent to
19.4 percent." To put the matter another way, the share of total
institutional shareholding held by pension funds increased from
26.3 percent in 1969 to 54.2 percent in 1985, whilst the share
held by insurance companies declined from 35.7 percent to 32.9
percent.
Two reflections are prompted by these figures. The first is
that the onward march of the institutions has not, it seems, suf-
fered a setback as a result of the now numerous privatisation
exercises that were carried out by the U.K. government in the
1980s." Privatisation may have increased the number of individ-
ual shareholders, but not the percentage of U.K. equities held by
individuals, which, indeed, continues to decline. The picture in
the United Kingdom continues to be one where equity invest-
ment directly by individuals is a relatively shallow activity.10
On the other hand-and this is the second reflec-
tion-indirect investment in equities by individuals has ex-
panded enormously over the last twenty-five years through the
retirement-driven growth of institutional shareholdings. The
reasons for this are broadly the same as in the United States. In
' Cosh, Hughes, Lee & Singh, Institutional Investment, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 1 INT'L J. INDuS. OG. 73, 77 (1989).
Pensions Investment Research Consultants Ltd., Intelligence 11 (July 1990).
8 Cosh, supra note 6. The percentage of equities held by unit trusts (open-ended
mutual funds) increased from 2.9% to 4.6%, and that held by investment trusts (close-
ended funds) fell from 10.1% to 3.0%.
1 The 1976 and 1980 figures, also reported by Cosh, supra note 6, show a steadily
rising trend in the percentage of equity shares held by the institutions through the pe-
riod 1969 to 1985; and the post-1985 figures suggest that trend has continued.
'0 "Only about 0.5 percent of the population now owns a serious portfolio containing
more than 10 shares." Fin. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at 14, col 1. This is despite the govern-
ment's encouragement, through tax relief, of "personal equity plans." Id.
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particular, the U.K. social security system, as envisaged by its
post-war architect, William Beveridge, was to be an agent for
the relief of poverty-and indeed poverty defined in fairly abso-
lute terms-rather than a broad income replacement scheme. Its
linchpin was a scheme that paid out flat-rate benefits in ex-
change for flat-rate contributions, and these contributions (and
therefore also the benefits) had to be set at a level that the
poorest workers could afford. This principle was applied to pen-
sions as much as to other social security benefits. Beveridge was
happy with this situation because he wished to create an incen-
tive for private (or, at any rate, non-state) initiatives that would
supplement the basic state pension."
In the 1970s there was some prospect that the state would
take a dominant role in the organisation of supplementary pen-
sion schemes, in which workers who could afford it would make
additional compulsory contributions, related to their earnings, in
exchange for an additional pension that was similarly related.
However, by that time the nonstate provision of supplementary
pensions through occupational pension schemes was so well es-
tablished that it was thought politically necessary to enable ade-
quate occupational schemes to contract out of the state supple-
mentary scheme. 12 Moreover, in the 1980s government became
so alarmed by the projected costs of the State Earnings-Related
Pension Scheme (SERPS) that it devised a scheme of generous
incentives to encourage those who had not contracted out of
SERPS through their membership in an occupational pension
scheme to contract out on an individual basis and to make per-
sonal pension arrangements with a private sector institution.3
Thus, it is fair to say that, throughout the post-war period,
state policy has left the task of guaranteeing an adequate income
in old age to private provision, either on an individual basis or,
more likely, through membership in a collective scheme linked
to one's employment. In light of this, it is not surprising that
one can chart a growing percentage of listed U.K. equities being
held by the pension funds, and it is likely too that a significant
11 SIR V. BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES (1942). In fact, in rela-
tion to old age pensions the government was slow to implement even Beveridge's subsis-
tence principle. J. HARRIS, WILLuIm BEVERIDGE 378-470 (1977).
L. HANNAH, INVENTING Rrm MrENT 46-64 (1986).
See, e.g., Nobles, Personal Pensions, 17 INDUS. L.J. 127 (1988).
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proportion of insurance company investment represents monies
contributed under insurance policies linked to the insured's
retirement.14
I1. SHAREHOLDER SOVEREIGNTY
Whilst shareholdings have become increasingly concen-
trated in the hands of the institutions, the essentials of the legal
• and self-regulatory frameworks within which shareholders'
rights are defined have not undergone a parallel transformation.
On the contrary, the proposition that decisions on fundamental
changes in the corporation's ownership or structure should lie in
the hands of the shareholders has remained intact. This is par-
ticularly true in the area of takeovers, which has been the focus
of the dispute between industry and the City over "short-term-
ism." Thus, the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, the self-
regulatory but nevertheless very effective set of rules that con-
trols tender offers and associated transactions in the United
Kingdom,15 remains committed to the proposition that in a bid
situation no action may:
be taken by the board of the offeree company in relation to the affairs
of the company, without the approval of the shareholders in general
meeting, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being
frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to de-
cide on its merits. 6
This is a strong rule, the thrust of which is to take the decision
about the success or failure of a bid out of the hands of the di-
rectors and place it in the hands of the shareholders. It consti-
tutes, in effect, a reordering of decision-making powers in the
company, in the sense that management powers, which the arti-
cles of association normally confer upon the board, may not be
exercised by that body if the effect of so doing is to remove the
decision on the takeover from the hands of the shareholders. It
14 Personal pension plans are particularly likely to take the form of policies entered
into with insurance companies.
" For a general description of the City Code and the City Panel, see MA. VWmn-
BERG, V. BLANK & L_ RADiNowrtz, WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKE-OVmm AND MERGmS
I 3-501 to 3-523 (5th ed. 1989).
"8 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (Great Britain), The City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers and the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares Bi, General




should be noted that the rule focuses upon the effects of the
directors' actions, not upon their good faith or the reasonable-
ness of their Views. If the effect of what the directors have done
or propose to do is to frustrate the bid, the City Code's rule is
broken, no matter that, they genuinely believe on reasonable
grounds that it would be in the best interests of the company
that a particular bid be rejected. It should be noted that the rule
applies as soon as the board of the offeree company "has reason
to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent" 17 and is
thus not confined to the situation where the board has con-
cluded that a sale of the company to a bidder has become inevi-
table.1' The rule covers the full range of actions the directors
might take, including the initiation of litigation on behalf of the
company, unless the company was obliged by a pre-bid contract
to take the step in question."'
The U.K. government, quite apart from its general commit-
ment to self-regulation in the takeover field, has shown no incli-
nation to push for changes that might increase the defensive
possibilities of the boards of target companies, not even changes
akin to the U.S. "second generation" statutes.20 On the contrary,
its main efforts in recent years in this field have been directed
towards ensuring that the principles underlying the City Code,
including the prohibition on frustrating action, are reflected in
the proposed European Community directive on takeovers.2 1 Of
course, the City Code applies only once a bid is imminent. The
management of a potential target has greater freedom of action
in a pre-bid situation, but even here equity controls the direc-
tors' actions through the "proper pirposes" doctrine. This as-
17 Id. at B1, General Principle No. 7.
18 Contrast Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) (sale inevitable) with Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1990) (sale not inevitable).
19 City Panel Statement No. 7 (1989) (Consolidated Gold Fields); City Panel State-
ment No. 20 (1989) (BAT Industries). However, the City Code may not operate so as to
catch decisions taken by the directors not qua directors but qua trustees of an employ-
ees' pension scheme. See the "poison pill" defence illustrated in Imperial Group Pension
Trust Ltd. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., [1991] 11 I.L.R.M. 66.
'0 M. STEINBERG, SECURITiES REGULATION: LIABiLITIES & REMEDIES 1108(3) (1991).
" U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Press Notice (Feb. 22, 1991). Amended
Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law concerning Takeover and
the General Bids, 33 OJ. EuP. CoM. (No. C 240) 7, art. 8 (Sept. 26, 1990) requires prior




pect of directors' fiduciary duties stipulates that the powers con-
ferred upon the directors by the articles can be validly exercised
only if the main purpose for the exercise of the power is one of
the purposes for which the powers were conferred upon the di-
rectors. In a large public company, whose articles create two sep-
arate and sovereign corporate decision-making bodies, the board
and the shareholders', it is unlikely that the court will conclude
that one of the proper purposes for which the directors' powers
can be exercised is to control the composition of the shareholder
body. This is a relatively strict test, which the directors cannot
escape by showing that they acted in good faith and on reasona-
ble grounds,22 but it does give management some freedom of ac-
tion because an exercise of power whose primary purpose is to
conclude a commercial arrangement of benefit to the company is
not open to challenge on the grounds that a subsidiary purpose
of the directors was to render the company a less easy or less
attractive target.
IIL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Given the concentration of equity shareholdings in institu-
tional hands and the commitment to shareholder sovereignty, it
is perhaps not surprising that concern about the level of take-
overs has expressed itself predominantly in the United Kingdom
in proposals to encourage shareholders to place greater weight
upon the monitoring of management and less weight upon the
market for corporate control as the means of ensuring effective
management. Although some industrialists engaged in the short-
termism debate may have wished for an outcome that restricted
shareholder power, 3 the majority of proposals for reform seem
rather to aim to channel that power along a different path by
placing a renewed emphasis upon the shareholders' role in cor-
porate governance. The arguments in this direction have been
"2 Hogg v. Cramphom Ltd., [1967] Ch. 254. In this respect English law seems to
approach the standard proposed by Professor Brudney in Fiduciary Ideology in Trans-
actions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 Mhicn L. Rav. 259, 263-82 (1986).
For example, Sir Hector Laing, Chairman of United Biscuits, has put forward as
"a positive step," the suggestion that shareholders should agree to an amendment of the
articles of association of their company "restrict[ing the percentage of a company's is-
sued share capital which can be voted by any one shareholder so long as earnings per
share continue to rise at a defined minimum rate." Sir H. Laing, The Balance of Respon-
sibilities, in CRT=v TENsiON? supra note 3, at 66.
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put most eloquently by Jonathan Charkham, an adviser to the
Governors of the Bank of England;2 ' The essence of his argu-
ment is that takeovers constitute an inefficient way of changing
the management of a company from the point of view of its
shareholders. He asks, rhetorically, "why change ownership if all
the company needs is a change of management?," especially as it
is the shareholders of the acquiring company who will reap the
lion's share of the benefit when the target company is revitalised
rather than the shareholders of the previously independent tar-
get (even after allowing for the bid premium).25 Of course, there
may be reasons for a takeover other than the need to replace
inefficient management, but where the latter is the reason he
urges upon the shareholders of the potential target the desirabil-
ity of "voice" over "exit." Indeed, he darkly predicts that insti-
tutional shareholders will lose, or at least have their legal rights
of ultimate control diluted, should they continue to be unwilling
to make greater use of them.
Unlike Germany and Japan, UK company management lacks both
regular sources of sympathetic influence and, in the rare cases where
it is essential, the stimulation of remedial action: the system depends
wholly on the company market which does not necessarily produce the
most cost effective answer or the best in structural terms, or give the
bulk of the rewards to those who might have enjoyed them. The Com-
panies Acts give shareholders the necessary powers to use this influ-
ence, but for various reasons they seldom do so. It would be to their
advantage collectively if they did.
The decisions fund managers make do not always relate to the
particular company in whose shares they are dealing - they may be
more to do with the balance of the fund, the state of a sector or of the
market or of the economy. One of the great virtues of the equity mar-
ket is its flexibility. Even so, shares are not just gaming chips and if
they are treated as if they were, and if both institutional and private
shareholders continue to neglect the introduction of ways of perform-
ing the limited duties the Companies Acts confer upon them, the in-
dustrial system will continue to underperform and that may in time
cast a shadow on the Companies Acts themselves. To argue that
shareholders cannot realistically be expected to play their part is to
J, . Charkham, Corporate Governance and the Market for Control of Companies,
Economics Div., Bank of England, Panel Paper No. 25 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter J.
Charkham Panel Paper]; J. Charkham, Corporate Governance and the Market for Con-
trol of Companies: Aspects of the Shareholders' Role, Economics Div., Bank of England,
Discussion Paper No. 44 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter J. Charkham Discussion Paper).
25 J. Charkham Discussion Paper, supra note 24, at 6.
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invite a reconsideration of alternative structures such as the two-tier
board which would facilitate their participation, and open the possi-
bility of participation of others.20
At one level, all this argument in favour of shareholder con-
trol is rather surprising. It is almost as if Berle and Means" had
never w itten and as if the separation of ownership and control
had never been noted. The answer of the supporters of share-
holder activism would no doubt be that the separation of owner-
ship and management roles in the large corporation is no doubt
inevitable, but the impotence of the owners and the arrogation
by the directors of both roles is avoidable where the ownership
rights are not unduly fragmented. In this light, the emergence of
the institutions as the major shareholders in large U.K. compa-
nies provides a basis for a reassertion of the old corporate law
orthodoxies in, it is said, a meaningful way. This is certainly a
development that would have surprised those who in the 1950s
and 1960s heralded the demise of the shareholders' unique posi-
tion of power as a necessary step towards enabling management
to be responsive to all the groups with an interest in the success
of the company.28 It is, on the other hand, a development very
much in tune with more general ideological developments in the
United Kingdom in the 1980s.
Whether one regards shareholder activism as conferring le-
gitimacy upon the private enterprise system or as demonstrating
its illegitimacy, there remain the lower order questions of which
mechanisms are available for shareholder expression and
whether even institutional shareholders are prepared to accept
the burden Charkham and others would thrust upon them.
Within the traditional structures shareholder activism should
presumably concentrate on securing an effective role for the
board in monitoring management. This, however, presents the
proponents of such activism with an immediate problem, since
the boards of large British companies have come to reflect, to a
perhaps unusual degree, the managerialist theory of corporate
control. A study in the early 1970s found that the typical board
of a large British company consisted of ten members of whom
26 Id. at 7.
" A. BrRLT AND G. MEA's. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPr" (rev.
ed. 1967).
'a C. CROSLAND. THE FUTURE OF SocAtlsmi 295-332 (rev. ed. 1964).
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eight were executives of the company or of another company in
the same group.29 Perhaps more worrying was the less system-
atic but nevertheless convincing evidence that the nonexecutive
directors were anything but independent of the senior manage-
ment of the company to whom they owed their appointment.
The situation was regarded as sufficiently disturbing by the
Bank of England and other City Panel bodies that in the early
1980s they sponsored the PRO NED movement.30 In 1987 PRO
NED issued a code recommending that at least three members
and about one-third of the board of a large company should be
independent nonexecutive directors, and that the nonexecutives
should dominate the audit, appointments and remuneration
committees of the board.31 Subsequent monitoring has suggested
that the PRO NED movement did have an impact on increasing
the number of nonexecutive directors appointed in the first half
of the 1980s, so that by 1985 about sixty percent of relevant
companies were in compliance with the numerical requirements
of the subsequently issued code. Progress since then, however,
seems to have been slow, and one suspects the campaign has to
some degree run out of steam. 2
What is difficult to resolve in assessing the impact of the
PRO NED movement is the degree of independence directors
who are appointed, in effect, by the executive directors of the
company can be expected to have. Even if the nonexecutives are
formally independent, in the sense of not having a previous em-
ployment or professional relationship with the company, one
may doubt whether persons beholden to the executive directors
for their appointment would then turn out in the majority of
cases to be effective monitors of their appointors. This issue has
29 BRITISH INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 2 (1972). On the
complexities involved in generalising about the role of non-executive directors, see C.
Brookes, Boards of Directors in British Industry, Department of Employment, Research
Paper 7, 37-39 (1979).
30 PRO NED is a voluntary body for the promotion of nonexecutive directors, sup-
ported by, inter alia, the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange, the Institutional Share-
holders' Committee and the Confederation of British Industry. The Stock Exchange,
whilst supporting the City Code, seems not to have made compliance with it a require-
ment for listed companies. See Stock Exchange (London, England), Admission of Securi-
ties to Listing § 5, ch. 2, 21.13 (rev. ed. 1979).
31 Non-Executive Directors: The PRO NED Code, 27 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL.
252 (1987).
32 Composition of Company Boards, 28 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL 242, 243 (1988).
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been discussed in the United States, 33 and it is not necessary to
add to that discussion, except to say that the problem would re-
solve itself if the nonexecutive directors were in fact, and not
just in name, the appointees of the shareholders rather than of
the executive directors. So at this point one has to face the sec-
ond issue of whether British institutional investors are willing to
take on the greater role that PRO NED enthusiasts would assign
to them. That institutional shareholders do from time to time
intervene, usually jointly, in the affairs of their portfolio compa-
nies is clear, and they do so usually when their rights or financial
interests are seen to be at stake. Thus, the recent recession has
provoked a number of occasions when the institutions have in-
tervened to secure management changes, often to enforce a split-
ting of the roles of chairman of the board and chief executive.3
Again, the institutional shareholders have devised an effective
common policy on the issue of when they will agree to the disap-
plication of their statutory preemption rights.30 The question,
however, is whether they share the view that the benefits likely
to be obtained by more closely monitoring the managerial per-
formance of their portfolio companies, whether through nonex-
ecutive directors or otherwise, are likely to outweigh the costs of
such a policy.
It is difficult to be optimistic that the institutional share-
holders will give an affirmative reply to this question. For many
years examples of ad hoc interventions by institutional share-
holders have led commentators to raise the issue of whether a
more systematic and continuous relationship between institu-
tional shareholders and management was about to evolve.30
However, that development has not come to pass. This might
suggest that, in the absence of a radical restructuring of the
framework within which investment decisions are made, the in-
stitutions have concluded that the present level of intervention
is the most efficient. R.E. Artus, Chief Investment Manager of
Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for institu-
tional Investors, 43 STAN. . L Rlv. 863 (1991).
1 See Fin. Times, Nov. 15, 1990, at 25, col 3, Nov. 26, 199D, at 21, col. 2, Dec. 3,
1990, at 16, col. 3 (machinery-investor protection cor mittees-for joint action by the
institutional shareholders has existed since the 1930s, and in the UK joint action faces
no insurmountable legal or regulatory problems).
Pre-emption Rights, 27 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BuLu. 545, 548 (1987).
'8 See Mundheim, supra note 4, at 86-90.
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the Prudential Corporation, which is "probably the largest single
shareholder in more British quoted companies than any other
investor, '3 7 has pointed to the structural limitations that make
only occasional intervention a rational policy for the institutions.
"Share ownership unaccompanied by the additional involvement
in providing finance and other services will never provide the
depth of knowledge and commitment that arises with the combi-
nation of banking and proprietary interests,"3 8 as in Germany or
Japan. This view would explain both why regular closer monitor-
ing is not attempted by institutional shareholders and why ad
hoc interventions are confined to the most obvious cases.
Closer monitoring by an individual institutional shareholder
may also cause it significant free-rider problems. One of the
functions of the institutions is to diversify risk, which mandates
fairly strict limits on the size of any one institution's holding in
any one company, and hence the limited benefit that an institu-
tion may capture if it acts on its own to redress managerial
weakness. Yet competition among institutional shareholders will
militate against effective joint action except in clear cases of cor-
porate failure. 9 What does seem to be the case is that the insti-
tutions themselves are far from convinced of the need for greater
activism than they currently demonstrate. In the absence of
changes in the legal or regulatory frameworks, for which the gov-
ernment seems to have no stomach, that may be a sufficient an-
swer in this particular debate.
IV. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF PENSION FUNDS
It is thus probably right to be somewhat sceptical about the
prospects for much greater activism by institutional sharehold-
ers in the United Kingdom in the near future. Nevertheless, I
would like finally to assume that such activism is in the cards
and to turn to an important issue raised by Professor Buxbaum,
which is the question of the legitimacy of the power that institu-
tional shareholders potentially wield. This is obviously both a
very broad and not a new issue, but it is worth looking at again
briefly. I will confine my comments to the most prominent of the
institutional shareholders, the pension funds. The argument that
37 R.E. Artus, Tension to Continue, in CREATIVE TENSION?, supra note 3, at 12.
Id. at 14.
31 See P.R. MARSH, supra note 3, at 86-90.
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can be raised is, in brief, that the trustees or managers of pen-
sion funds have not built up their shareholding positions in their
portfolio companies by investing their own money, but by in-
vesting monies contributed, typically, by the employer, on the
one hand, as sponsor of the pension scheme, and by the employ-
ees, on the other. For the latter, the opportunity to join an occu-
pational pension scheme and to earn benefits under it is "part of
the consideration which an employee receives in return for the
rendering of his services. 40 If pension funds are to play a role in
making management more accountable to the shareholders,
should there not also be a mechanism for making the sharehold-
ers, namely the pension fund trustees and mangers, accountable
to the people who have contributed the investment monies?
This is an issue to which, surprisingly at first sight, the pro-
ponents of greater shareholder activism have given little atten-
tion. This seems to be because they assume that the role of the
shareholders, to make management more efficient, would be un-
controversial (at least among the beneficiaries of the institu-
tional shareholders). Efficiency is conceived in terms of raising
the rate of return on the company's capital, and it seems to be
assumed that there are effective mechanisms to ensure that the
newly active institutional shareholders pursue such an efficiency
goal. This is, indeed, not an implausible viewpoint when one
takes into account both the competitive performance pressures
upon, at least, outside managers of pension funds41 and the stan-
dard formulation of the duties of pension fund trustees. How-
ever, there are tantalising suggestions in Professor Buxbaum's
article that greater institutional shareholder activism might-be a
mechanism for building wider concerns into managerial decision
making than currently occurs.42 He mentions environmental
concerns; one could imagine others. If pension funds are to play
a role in restructuring managerial decision making, then it is
submitted that the accountability to the beneficiaries of the
trustees and managers of pension funds, with respect to their
relations with portfolio companies, becomes a pressing issue.
In the 1970s in the United Kingdom there was some debate,
40 Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., [19911 11 I.L.R.
66, 70.
"1 See Jackson, supra note 5, at 253.
42 Buxbaun, supra note 1.
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in the context of employee involvement in management, that
might have led to the creation of institutional structures that
could have been used to address this matter. The then govern-
ment proposed that half of the membership of the controlling
bodies of pension funds should be appointed through the ma-
chinery of the relevant trade unions,43 but like the other "irtdus-
trial democracy" proposals44 of the time it was never enacted.
This leaves the trustees' fiduciary duties at common law as the
main component of the relevant legal framework, but, as in the
United States, those duties are not defined in the United King-
dom in a way that is at all receptive to the sort of restructuring
Professor Buxbaum mentions. Thus, in the leading case of
Cowan v. Scargill,45 it was held that to implement a proposal
prohibiting investment of the miners' pension fund overseas or
in energy industries competing with the coal industry would be a
breach of the trustees' duty to act in the beneficiaries' best in-
terests. The court suggested that only in rare instances would it
be in the best interests of the beneficiaries for the trustees to
choose investments which did not yield the best return in terms
of income and capital appreciation. In the absence, then, of spe-
cific powers in the trust deed, the trustees' freedom to have re-
gard to wider considerations would seem to be limited to choos-
ing among investments of equal financial attractiveness or to
situations where the aim of the investment is to preserve the
viability of the sponsoring employer and where the viability of
the pension fund itself is dependent upon continuing contribu-
tions from that source.
CONCLUSION
In some ways the short-termism debate, although in itself
rather inconclusive, has had. an exciting sequel, in that it has
reanimated the discussion over corporate governance issues in
43 See WHITE PAPER ON OCCUPATION PENSION SCHEMES, THE ROLE OF MEMBERS IN
THE RUNNING OF SCHEMES, Cmnd. 6514, 31, 33 (1976). The OPB itself had been less
enthusiastic about this idea. See OPB, SOLVENCY, DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND MEM-
BER PARTICIPATION IN OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES, Cmnd. 5904, 11 105-25 (1975);
Note, Occupational Pensions, 6 INDUS. L.J. 188 (1977).
" Davies, The Bullock Report and Employee Participation in Corporate Planning
in the UK, 1 J. CoME. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 245 (1978).
" [1985] Ch. 270. See Nobles, Investment Policies & Trustees' Duties, 13 INDUS,
L.J. 167 (1984).
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the United Kingdom. The most immediate proposal to
emerge-greater shareholder activism and the reinvigoration of
the position of the nonexecutive director-is in fact a rather
traditional one and is perhaps not likely to be taken up effec-
tively in the near future. Nevertheless, if the current debate on
governance could be linked up with the more radical proposi-
tions from the 1970s, and if both could come to grips with the
accountability question, especially within pension schemes,
something novel and worthwhile might yet emerge.

